

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Peter THOMAS

(United Kingdom)

Later:

Sir Paul MASON

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LOBODYCZ

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. H. SOKALSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. V. CONSTANTINESCU

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. M.N. SHELEPIN

Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom:

Mr. Peter THOMAS

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Mr. S. de PALMA

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the two hundred and third meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Before we move to the formal business, I believe the two co-Chairmen have something to say to the Committee, and therefore I call first on Mr. Timberlake of the United States.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): I should like to take note with keen regret of the fact that this is the last time Sir Paul Mason will be with us as a member of the United Kingdom delegation. Sir Paul has been participating in this Committee since December 1962, and in the business of disarmament since long before that. His departure means for all of us the loss of a very good friend and colleague. Through his command of the subject-matter of disarmament, his good humour, his fairness and his keen desire to see us make progress, he has left an enduring impression on this Conference. As Mr. Foster has said in a letter that I have just transmitted to Sir Paul,

"All of us have always admired and will now miss your outstanding abilities as a diplomat, your great experience as a disarmament negotiator and, above all, your personal qualities of a kind and thoughtful human being."

On behalf of Mr. Foster, myself and the whole of the United States delegation, I bid Sir Paul Godspeed as he embarks on a new phase of his career. In whatever his new activities may be, he has, I know, the best wishes of all of us here.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have known Sir Paul Mason for a number of years. We first met him here in the field of disarmament back in 1958 when, together with Mr. David Ormsby-Gore, he was representing the United Kingdom at the Three-Power Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. At that time we were able to work together in the field of disarmament for two months only. Then Sir Paul Mason changed the sphere of his interests and began to represent the United Kingdom in the NATO Council -- that is, he took a greater interest in military problems. But after two or three years in that field he returned to us and we began to work together on the problem of disarmament; and as he told me yesterday, he considers that he was after all in the right quarter. We are glad to hear it.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

I fully associate myself with the good wishes and the words of appreciation of Sir Paul Mason's personal qualities which have just been expressed by our United States colleague, and I should like to express our sincere regret that we must part, Sir Paul. We hope, however, that you will continue to take an interest in and, to the extent of your powers and opportunities, contribute to the cause of disarmament; because such ways are open to you as the Press, the radio and so forth, through which, by expressing the right point of view in favour of disarmament, you would be able to influence the formation of opinion in the right direction.

I should like to wish Sir Paul Mason good health and success in his private life and in public affairs after he leaves our Conference.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The voice of my country should certainly not be missing in this chorus of farewell wishes for Sir Paul Mason; but I believe that I speak not only for my own country but for all the non-aligned countries participating in this Conference when I express our deep appreciation for having had the privilege of working with such an esteemed colleague as Sir Paul Mason. I should like to pay a special tribute to the felicity of phrase with which he is endowed and which we have so much enjoyed.

Sir Paul has certainly made his mark as a very genial and dedicated member of what I might call "our club", this Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. He has been very active in that club, the members of which are always ready both inside and outside the Committee to discuss disarmament problems, because we know that these are of such vital concern to all aspects of human life. Sir Paul certainly is interested in many of those aspects of our human existence, cultural as well as political. We wish him a life full of rich opportunities to cultivate those interests; and we are certain also that our club, our Conference, will continue to benefit from his preoccupation with world problems, a preoccupation which I am certain will not now cease.

Mr. PROTITCH (Special Representative of the Secretary-General): I am sure that members of the Committee will not be surprised that the usual silence of the Secretariat is broken on this occasion in order to express, on behalf of my colleagues and myself, our best wishes to Sir Paul Mason, and to thank him for the constant kindness he has shown to us during the years of his work on this Committee and before. I am grateful for this opportunity to say how sorry we are to see Sir Paul Mason leave our Conference.

Mr. NEHRU (India): I should like to say a few words both in my personal capacity and as representative of a non-aligned country which has special relations with your country, Mr. Chairman, and also is part of the Afro-Asian world.

This is in many ways a sad occasion, as has been said. We are saying good-bye to a distinguished colleague and friend. As we have been reminded today, it is two years or more since Sir Paul Mason has been with us here and has served with us on this Committee. If I may say so, like all of us here he has served not only his own country but the world community as a whole; and that is a point which I should like to emphasize. The task which has been entrusted to us -- as I am sure we are all agreed -- is of world importance. In carrying out that task a special role has been assigned to the non-aligned countries. If we are to succeed in that role, it seems to us, it is necessary that there be good will and co-operation among us all.

I should like to take this opportunity to say that the co-operation, friendship, good will and understanding which Sir Paul Mason showed on all occasions in the Conference has been of the greatest value to us. We who belong to the non-aligned countries appreciate the role which Sir Paul Mason has played. Now Sir Paul will be going away from our Conference to engage in new activities. They say that an old soldier never dies; nor, if I may say so, does an expert on disarmament. I do not know if Sir Paul Mason intends to follow the example of his predecessor and write a book on disarmament; but, whether he does so or not, I am sure that his good wishes will be with us and that he will take every opportunity to contribute to our work by presenting us with new ideas on every suitable occasion.

On behalf of my delegation I wish to thank Sir Paul once again and extend to him our warmest good wishes for the future.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I am sure the Committee will not accuse me of departing in any way from any procedure of the past if I now call on Sir Paul Mason.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing me, even if in this procedure you and I may be straying somewhere near the borders of established order.

I have been deeply moved -- who could fail to be? -- by the undeservedly kind words of our two co-Chairmen, of our colleagues from Sweden and India, and of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

Sad though I am to be leaving this Committee, I am glad that it should be at a moment when it is not too optimistic to say one can descry some light on the horizon that lies ahead. This Committee is not, and in the nature of things cannot be, a policy-making body; but I have always believed that, when the governments are prepared to move forward, it offers an almost ideal negotiating machine, because of the breadth of representation which we have here, because of the wealth of experience we have gained, and because of the fact that through long months of working together we have come to know, and in many cases to understand, our respective points of view.

There are perhaps two ways in which this efficient machine could even be improved: if we are not afraid to embark on negotiations of limited scope simply because their scope is limited; and if we show ourselves ready to take part in detailed discussions without necessarily first trying to resolve the points of principle which lie behind.

My colleagues will recognize in what I have just said what I may perhaps call my signature tune; and it is now high time that I signed myself off the air. Will you perhaps allow me just two concluding sentences? First, I should like to record my deep and humble gratitude for the unfailing courtesy, indulgence and consideration with which I have always been treated. I have done my best to repay this in a small way by not knowingly indulging in polemics or partisanship. Second, and last, I must now make my profession of faith. I believe profoundly in the work which we are doing here -- work in which I have been honoured to take a small part. I am convinced that disarmament will be achieved, because I believe it to be the will of Providence that it should be so.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and thank you once more, by dear colleagues and friends.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): We now turn to the formal business of the meeting.

Mr. LOBODYCZ (Poland): I should like to associate myself with those speakers who have just bidden farewell to Sir Paul Mason. May a few words of ours be accepted by Sir Paul as an expression of our sincere recognition and appreciation of his valuable contribution to the work of the Committee.

Allow me now to thank all those who were kind enough to extend a welcome to me upon my return to the Committee last week.

The Polish delegation has already, on more than one occasion, had an opportunity of presenting its views on the subject of the reduction of military budgets. The idea of budgetary cuts in military expenditures, put forward by the Soviet Union (ENDC/123), has enjoyed the broad support of members of the Committee. Our support for the proposal of a percentage reduction of military budgets is prompted by numerous reasons, but first and foremost by recognition of the role which the reduction of military expenditures might play as one of the important collateral measures of disarmament.

First, the restriction of the financial base of armaments would bring about their consequent limitation and constitute a significant factor in the efforts towards arresting the armaments race.

Secondly, the cutting of military expenditures and its impact upon the halting of the armaments race would reduce tension in international relations, increase mutual confidence, and thus create conditions conducive to further disarmament measures.

Thirdly, the reduction of military budgets would stimulate the development both of national economies and of international economic relations.

Fourthly, such a collateral measure of disarmament can easily be implemented by States. The decisions of the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce their military budgets in 1964 are a telling illustration of this point.

The reservations expressed by the representative of the United Kingdom on 25 June (ENDC/PV.193, pp.3b et seq.) are unconvincing, to say the least. In regard to the alleged difficulty stemming from the so-called incomparability of military budgets, it should be stated that, regardless of how many details of military budgets are available, the global budgetary amount is known, and therefore there exists no uncertainty about the final result of the 10 to 15 per cent reduction. Since each

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State would be free to select the elements of its budget subject to reduction, one can assume that it would cut its military expenditures in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of its own security. Thus it would be the individual States which would determine what would be the practical impact of a cut in military expenditures upon particular kinds of armaments. Hence, while military budgets are reduced, differences in their structure, or, speaking more generally, differences in the structure of their economies, could in no way jeopardize the interests of the other side.

I do not claim that the intention of the representative of the United Kingdom was merely to look for difficulties and pitfalls; but there are good reasons to believe that it was on such matters that he focussed his attention, while the key to the solution of the problem lies in the political decision to reduce military expenditures. His reservations about the Soviet initiative are irrelevant, the more so since new proposals were submitted to the Committee by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union on 18 and 25 June (ENDC/PV.191, p.17; PV.193, pp.33 et seq., 49, 50). Indeed, they express such a flexible approach to the problem that one could hardly find any justification for the reluctance of the Western Powers, unless those Powers deny the very concept of the reduction of military budgets.

At this juncture let me recall the Soviet statement to the effect that, taking into consideration certain difficulties of some of the Western Powers, a solution could be accepted under which States participating in the work of the Committee would in one form or another freely express their intention --

"... to take the path of reducing their military budgets, and ... appeal to other States to follow that example." (ENDC/PV.193, p.34)

Progress in the solution of the problem could also be facilitated by another Soviet proposal, according to which the reduction of military budgets should be started by States which "have the greatest military importance and have large military budgets" (ENDC/PV.191, p.17). Needless to say, that principle takes into account the interests of smaller States.

Likewise we appreciate the fact that the Soviet Union has taken account of the suggestions of non-aligned countries on the application of certain sums released as a consequence of an agreement on military budget reductions for the purpose of assisting the developing States (ibid.; ENDC/PV.193, pp.31,32). This proposal responds to the appeal contained in the resolution of the General Assembly of 11 December 1963 on the conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament (A/RES/1931 (XVIII)).

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The method of technical studies proposed by the representatives of the Western Powers would if accepted lead, I submit, to the postponement sine die of the solution of the problem of the reduction of military budgets.

It is our considered view that the time has come to make at least a step forward in finding a solution to the problem of the reduction of military budgets. That is why we lend our support to the new Soviet proposals, which contain feasible goals without infringing the interests of either party. What is more, they take account of the objective difficulties of the other side, they are based on realistic premises, and they follow a proper direction consistent with the tasks of our Committee.

Having listened to the statements made at the 201st meeting on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and especially having read the verbatim record, I wish to draw the Committee's attention to the problem which, as is known, is of particular concern to Poland.

The replies of Western delegations to questions put by Deputy Minister Zorin on their readiness to conclude an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons have been, from the formal point of view, in the affirmative. The Western representatives claim, however, that such an agreement does not preclude the possibility that some NATO States might conclude another agreement, under the terms of which the multilateral nuclear force could be created.

Notwithstanding the differences in the approach of individual Western representatives to the question of the participation of their respective countries in the multilateral force, it should be stated that they are in agreement on the alleged compatibility of obligations under an agreement on non-dissemination on the one hand, and the creation of the multilateral nuclear force on the other.

As may be concluded from the statements of our Western colleagues, they in fact perceive the evil stemming from a possibility of the spread of nuclear weapons. But at the same time they support, or at least do not object to, the establishment of a new military arrangement providing for a peculiar form of dissemination of nuclear weapons through the co-ownership of and the share in control over nuclear weapons by non-nuclear States members of NATO. Such an attitude is an illustration of what was said by a Roman poet: "Video meliora, proboque: deteriora sequor".

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It goes without saying that for at least one of its members, the Federal Republic of Germany, obtaining access to nuclear weapons within the multilateral force would be but a prelude to further claims. After all, even at the present time -- that is, before the creation of the multilateral force -- the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is not concealing its ambition to be given more rights in the control of nuclear weapons. Though the problem is of paramount importance, it is not my intention to dwell at length on it, since my predecessor in this Committee, Mr. Lachs, spoke extensively on the matter -- I need mention only his intervention at the 199th meeting.

I submit that I am entitled to ask the following question. Where should we look for guarantees that the Federal Republic of Germany, having become part of the multilateral force, will not insist on, and consequently force through, the extension of its participation in the control of nuclear weapons? Or is not the very perspective of a West German share in the control of nuclear weapons within the MLF a sufficient evil? The approach of the Federal Republic of Germany to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is but too clearly illustrated by the fact that an influential West German politician, a member of the ruling party, Mr. Karl Theodor von Cattenberg, in his new book terms a possible agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as an agreement bearing "the brand of Cain".

For the United States to provide opportunities for non-nuclear States to share in the control of nuclear weapons within the framework of the MLF can have but one effect: the advancement of the process of equipping West Germany with nuclear weapons and consequently satisfying its nuclear ambitions, which amount to obtaining unrestricted control over these weapons.

Our fears are shared by some Western quarters. The report of the Assembly of the Western European Union entitled "State of European Security, Disarmament and the Nuclear Force", when discussing the multilateral nuclear force, states clearly that the aim of the United States "to divert West Germany" -- as it is cautiously put -- "from her supposed national nuclear ambitions" can "have the reverse effect".

Realizing the particular importance of central Europe to the security of the entire continent, and not only to the security of Europe, Poland has spared no efforts to bring about a halt in the armaments race, and especially the nuclear armaments race, in this area. In this connexion let me recall the Polish plan for

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the creation of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone, (ENDC/C.1/1), which was followed by the recent Gomulka plan calling for the freezing of nuclear armaments in central Europe (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). The two plans, in different degrees, aim at rendering impossible the further spread of nuclear weapons on a regional scale. Their implementation could bring about the strengthening of security and could facilitate disarmament solutions.

Having said that, let me now concentrate on some questions which occur to me, first of all in connexion with the intervention made by the representative of the United States on 23 July. Mr. Timberlake has once again confirmed (ENDC/PV.201, pp.33 et seq.) that the United States seeks such a solution of the problem of non-dissemination as would not prevent the implementation of its concept that the NATO countries should be granted the right of co-decision in the field of nuclear weapons within the alliance, and thus that the multilateral nuclear force should be created. Consequently, as the point of departure an approach has been accepted that an agreement on non-dissemination should only contain, apart from appropriate obligations not to produce nuclear weapons, a ban on transferring such weapons to national control. This is a thesis which we cannot accept.

The danger which now exists comes down to providing that the non-nuclear members of the Western alliance, and particularly West Germany, should participate in the control of nuclear weapons within a NATO arrangement. It is for the same purposes that those States are given scientific and technical information and other forms of assistance in mastering the technology of nuclear weapon application.

It is the crux of all negotiations to harmonize the common, but in some aspects contradictory, interests of the parties. The more important the interests of States involved, the more significant is this postulate. Undoubtedly disarmament negotiations do concern the most vital interests of States: the interests of their security. With that in mind, let me emphasize that the creation of the multilateral nuclear force would hurt the most vital interests of Poland, and first of all its security, as a result of the danger to security in general which such a force might entail.

It can be seen clearly from an analysis of the relationship of forces in NATO that the chief, if not the only, beneficiary of a multilateral force would be the Federal Republic of Germany -- a State which combines two elements in its policy

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each of which gives reason for serious concern. What I have in mind are, on the one hand, the strivings of the West German Government to possess the most modern military build-up, including ever broader participation in the control of nuclear weapons, and, on the other hand, its efforts to reverse the political situation existing in central Europe as a result of the Second World War. The latter point is exemplified by the territorial claims in regard to Poland and other countries.

The question arises whether and how the United States seeks to reconcile the need to create conditions favourable for disarmament negotiations, and particularly for working out an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, with the method of disregarding the arguments of the other side, especially when the interests of national security, as in the case of Poland, and, indeed, of security in general, are involved. Would not such neglect of the position of the most interested countries be tantamount to self-righteousness or, as has been said often here, to claiming a monopoly of wisdom?

The participants in disarmament negotiations should be guided by two fundamental principles: first, they should take due account of the security requirements of all parties and hence of the position of the other side; secondly, they should refrain from all steps which could lead to the growth of international tension. Since the creation of the multilateral force is being proceeded with in disregard of both the security needs of other States and the tension which that force is bound to create, the position of the United States concerning non-dissemination of nuclear weapons cannot be reconciled with such principles.

The necessity for avoiding such steps as would arouse the apprehension of the other side and increase tension has already been stressed in this Committee by the representatives of India, the United Arab Republic and Nigeria. Their statements have been quoted by, among others, the representative of Bulgaria (ENDC/PV.201, pp.12,13) and my predecessor in this Committee (ENDC/PV.195, p.23). Therefore I shall avail myself of this opportunity to recall only what was said by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo, on 23 July. Speaking about the consequences of the establishment of the multilateral nuclear force, he underlined the fact that we might witness --

"... the birth of a new arms race which would leave its predecessors in the shade, for it would be a nuclear and multilateral arms race."

(ENDC/PV.201, p.21)

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When evaluating the impact of the creation of the multilateral force we should not lose sight of the fact that, while striving to implement its officially-declared objectives, the Government of the German Federal Republic can -- and could even more as a participant in the multilateral force -- involve its allies in the disastrous effects of its policy. We are not alone in this evaluation. It is confirmed, for instance, by Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, the authors of the book "Arms and Stability in Europe", who, referring in fact to the Federal Republic of Germany, state:

"In circumstances of exceptional tension, it is possible that one or other of the European Powers might attempt, or appear to attempt, to involve the whole alliance in a private venture."

To conclude my remarks, I wish to stress that we consider the creation of the multilateral nuclear force to be incompatible with the idea of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The acceptance of a different interpretation would result in opening loopholes for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by those who do not now possess them. We should be happy to see our Western partners take our arguments into consideration and draw proper conclusions from them.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): Before beginning my speech on the subject on the agenda, I wish, like the previous speakers, to express my appreciation of Sir Paul Mason's work in this Committee, which has always been marked by a profound dedication to, and a sincere faith in, the cause of disarmament and peace, by his own engaging character, and by his typically British spirit of fair compromise.

I say "Au revoir" to Sir Paul Mason with emotion and with the feelings not of a colleague, but, if Sir Paul will allow me to say so, of a friend from whom he may be separated by circumstances but never in spirit. I also wish to thank him for his constant and habitual kindness, not forgetting in these thanks his charming wife Lady Mason, who is so closely associated with the success of her husband's career.

Sir Paul Mason leaves us as a young man of sixty. Some say that life begins at forty, others at fifty. I am sure the Committee will agree unanimously, without even consulting the co-Chairmen, that at sixty life has hardly begun. I therefore wish Sir Paul, in his new life, as much satisfaction and success as he enjoyed in a diplomatic career which earned him the highest distinctions of his gracious sovereign.

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Turning now to the item on today's agenda, I should first of all like to observe that our very presence around this table shows that we all want and hope to reduce armaments and hence military expenditure. The reduction and even the elimination of this expenditure is in any case part and parcel of the Western and Soviet draft treaties on general and complete disarmament. In conformity with those proposals, the Italian Government hopes that a step-by-step application of balanced and controlled disarmament measures will lead to a step-by-step reduction in the military expenditure of all countries. That is our aspiration, although my country is already endeavouring to keep its military expenditure within the narrowest limits compatible with the essential requirements of national security and collaboration with our Allies. This aspiration is all the stronger since Italy, which has already contributed amply to the needs of the developing countries, is well aware of the importance of deriving additional funds for this purpose from the resources released by disarmament.

To achieve these economies, we must make an effective reduction in our military efforts, and this reduction will undoubtedly be reflected in the military budgets of the various countries. Thus the Western proposals which have been submitted to this Committee as collateral measures (ENDC/120) would if adopted entail considerable and immediate budgetary economies. However, these proposals have not yet been accepted by the Soviet delegation, although it continues to insist on the need for a reduction in military expenditure.

As we see it, the Soviet delegation's position is characterized by two somewhat contradictory tendencies. On the one hand it asks for a reduction of 10 - 15 per cent in military budgets -- or, at any rate, for an appeal for such a reduction --; and on the other it refuses to contribute to the efforts which could in concrete fashion lead to immediate reductions in military expenditure, for instance a "freeze" of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or a "cut-off". The Soviet delegation is also unwilling to undertake a thorough study of the problem of military budgets, so as to ascertain whether, and to what extent, budgetary action would lead to practical results affecting disarmament.

My delegation and the other Western delegations have already explained at previous meetings the difficulties entailed in the study, interpretation and comparability of military budgets. Moreover, the United States delegation has

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pointed out the sketchy character of available data regarding the Soviet defence budget. Clearly, without preparatory technical studies and suitable explanations, any attempt to achieve disarmament through military budgets is foredoomed to failure.

The Soviet delegation invites us to launch an appeal in favour of a reduction of military budgets (ENDC/PV.193, p.49). Suppose for a moment that this Committee agrees to such an appeal and also that this leads to action by some Western countries and by the Soviet Union; suppose that the Soviet Union and the United States respond favourably to the appeal. We should then know exactly what budgetary economies the United States had carried out, the items involved, and the degree to which the defence effort had been effectively diminished. We should know that because the United States military budget, like those of other Western countries, is detailed, open and accessible to all.

But what should we know about the reductions announced by the Soviet Union? In all probability we should only have one figure: the total of the published Soviet defence budget would be below the previous one. We should receive no other explanation. I do not wish to cast doubts on the good faith of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation must see that such a declaration by its Government would not be based on any concrete facts or on any verifiable data, while the reductions in military expenditure announced by the Western countries would be based on concrete data and easily-verified evidence.

There would thus be an imbalance which would inevitably engender insecurity and doubt. In other words, the effectiveness of the appeal would be, on one side at any rate, very doubtful: it would have no practical value, verification would be impossible, and mutual security would not be increased. Indeed, there is little likelihood that the Soviet delegation, which has not given us the explanations requested on the budgetary reductions already carried out by its Government, would consent to give us explanations on future reductions effected by its Government in response to an appeal launched by this Committee. There is every reason to fear that we should remain in the dark.

If a reduction in military budgets is to be taken into consideration as a factor favouring disarmament, we must first of all speak a common budgetary language. The structural differences between the military budgets of collectivist States and those

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of other States are naturally very great. The opportunities for concealing military expenditures, which are always present in all budgets, are particularly great in those of the Eastern States because of their economic régime. That is not a criticism, but merely a statement of fact -- a fact that we cannot overlook. That is why we continue to hold that those who really wish to launch an appeal for a reduction in military budgets, in order to promote disarmament, should be the first to ask for the early initiation of comparative studies of the various systems, in order to facilitate, if that is possible, the adoption of that method of reducing armaments.

To sum up, I have always been convinced that the true path to a reduction in military budgets is that of effective disarmament -- that is to say, physical disarmament. However, animated as we are by a spirit of compromise, we do not refuse to study in a concrete manner the problem of military budgets from the technical aspect, in order to determine whether it is possible -- and if so how -- to achieve agreed, effective and objectively verified reductions.

I do not consider that we shall make any progress in the matter of military budgets at this Conference so long as, for fear of revealing military secrets which, so far as we are concerned, are perfectly well-known, one of the parties refuses to exchange technical information with the other and make a joint study of the problems.

Today's meeting is devoted to collateral measures; but I should like to allude to a measure which is not on our agenda although it has been proposed for discussion by both the Western and the Eastern delegations. I refer to a ban on underground nuclear tests. Our Committee undertook to make a report on that subject to the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is now several months since we resumed our labours, but that very important question has not yet been broached. Several delegations drew attention to it at our last session, and the Italian delegation has done so several times. The matter has now become urgent. The present session cannot go on much beyond the beginning of September, and our agenda has already been fixed until 20 August. It is time we studied that question.

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I know that the question of tests is very difficult and that we shall probably run up against the usual obstacle of inspection -- that inspection which we hold to be absolutely necessary. However, we must renew and redouble our efforts. We must be in a position to tell the General Assembly that the matter has been debated here and that on our side every effort has been made to achieve an agreement.

To save time, I suggest that the two co-Chairmen should study the matter at their talks. They could then report to us and the Committee could devote at least one or two meetings to a discussion of their report. That is not a formal proposal. Nor am I asking the co-Chairmen and the Committee to reply today. It is merely an idea which I put before you with the two aims of bringing to the Committee's notice a problem which must be studied, and of speeding up our work, without however neglecting the other important matters already on our agenda.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has repeatedly expressed in the Committee the view that among the items on our agenda there is at least one question the solution of which does not require any particular efforts and ought not to give rise to any difficulties if everyone has the will to achieve agreement. That question is the reduction of military budgets.

At the beginning of the present session of the Committee our delegation showed (ENDC/PV.193, pp.27 et seq.) why we consider the solution of the question of reducing military budgets a relatively easy matter which we could probably accomplish during this session. We pointed out that a definite start to the development of events in the right direction had been given by the decisions of the Soviet Union, the United States and a number of other countries to reduce their military budgets for 1964. We stressed that an agreement to reduce military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, as proposed by the Soviet Government (ENDC/123), would substantially reduce the arms race and at the same time would not necessitate the settlement of various complicated military and technical problems connected with the disclosure by States of the structure of their defence systems, as would be the case when working out measures for the elimination of any particular type of weapon.

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Having reached agreement on a specific reduction of their military budgets, States would be free to decide which items of their military budgets would be affected by this agreed reduction so as not to prejudice the interests of their national security. We also stated at that time that the Soviet Government agreed to the allocation of a certain portion of the resources saved as a result of the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent to rendering assistance to developing countries.

That such a measure as the reduction of military budgets really involves no difficulties and is simple and easy to implement is clearly shown by the fact that in their statements on this question the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee have been unable to put forward a single serious and convincing argument against such a measure. Today the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, tried to reproach the Soviet delegation with some inconsistency. He saw this inconsistency in the fact that on the one hand the Soviet delegation proposes a reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, and on the other hand refuses to accept the proposal of the Western Powers for a freeze of the production of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles (ENDC/120). But, Mr. Cavalletti, you know perfectly well from our previous discussion that a freeze is not a disarmament measure. Yet at the same time this measure is linked with the question of establishing international control over the entire nuclear industry, which affects in the most sensitive way the security interests of States. It is evident that in these conditions this measure is impracticable. But the reduction of military budgets would not give rise to any difficulties; this process has already begun and there is no justification for refusing to take further steps in the same direction.

Since some States have declared that they do not intend, for certain reasons of domestic or foreign policy, to enter at present into a concrete agreement to reduce their military budgets, the Soviet delegation has endeavoured to keep alive an idea which has already made some headway in actual life. The Soviet delegation suggested that in order to prepare the ground for such concrete agreements the Committee should, at the present session, at least express approval of the steps already taken by some States to reduce their military budgets, and that it should

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approve an appeal to those States to continue the course of reducing military budgets, and to call upon other States to follow this example (ENDC/PV.193, pp.34,35,49). The adoption of such a decision by the Committee would undoubtedly help to some extent to maintain in the world a progressive movement in the direction of reducing the arms race and lessening the danger of war. We stated our readiness to begin immediately, together with the other delegations, the preparation of a corresponding draft declaration or appeal by the Committee.

Since then quite some time has gone by, but we have not received any reply from the Western Powers to this proposal, although everyone knows that it has gained great popularity and is supported by both the socialist and the non-aligned countries represented on the Committee. We still hope that the Western Powers will give a positive reply at least to this extremely simple proposal of a very general nature. If the Western Powers take this course, it cannot be doubted that even before the end of the present session the Committee will be able to adopt a statement, appeal or declaration in favour of a reduction of the military budgets of States. In this document it would, of course, be possible to take into account the particular situations of various countries. And then the Committee would be able to report to the United Nations General Assembly a small but nevertheless constructive result of its work.

The Soviet delegation now intends, as it informed the Committee last Thursday, to pass on to the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

A brief evaluation of the statements made by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy at the meeting on 23 July was given by us at the same meeting last Thursday (ENDC/PV.201, pp.36,37). Having carefully studied in the verbatim record the statements made by Mr. Timberlake, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Burns and Mr. Cavalletti, we should like to tell the Committee quite definitely that our preliminary critical evaluation of the statements of those representatives has not only been unshaken but has simply been further confirmed.

We note once again that the representatives of the Western Powers in the Committee have not given a positive reply to our question (ENDC/PV.195, p.15) whether they are prepared to conclude a comprehensive agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which would preclude any possibility for their dissemination -- whether directly or indirectly -- and would close to non-nuclear States any channels and loop-holes permitting access to such weapons, including through military blocs, for instance, through allowing such States to participate in the possession, disposition and control of such weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It was no mere chance that, in stating their alleged positive reply to the Soviet delegation's question, the representatives of the Western Powers, particularly Mr. Thomas and Mr. Burns, had recourse to an ingenuous and by no means new device -- they simply left out of our question that part of it which precisely concerned the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons through military alliances. They pretended that we had not yet asked them about that. But, gentlemen, that is precisely what we did ask you: namely, are you prepared to enter into such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would bar access to these weapons through military blocs as well? But you have avoided giving a reply to this most essential part of our question.

The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy have stated that they are prepared to conclude only such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would not prevent the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the only purpose of which is to ensure access to these weapons by the West German revenge-seekers. It follows quite clearly from the statements of the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Italy that for them the NATO multilateral nuclear force takes the first place while the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons takes the second place. For this reason they are trying to make an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons fit in with the multilateral force by proposing to limit the scope of such an agreement in such a way that, while prohibiting the transfer of nuclear weapons to the national control of non-nuclear States, at the same time it would not prohibit the admission of non-nuclear States to participation in the multilateral possession, disposition and control of nuclear weapons. Mr. Burns spoke in considerable detail on this subject: He said:

"We favour" -- he emphasized -- "negotiation in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee of an international agreement which would contain specific provisions that no nuclear Power would hand over control of nuclear weapons to any nation not now possessing them." (ENDC/PV.201, p.28)

Mr. Burns went on to explain what precisely he means by "control of nuclear weapons" and "possession of nuclear weapons". In order not to be misunderstood, I venture to quote Mr. Burns's definition in its entirety:

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"'Control' over nuclear weapons we define as the independent power and authority of a nation to order a nuclear weapon to be launched. By 'possession' of nuclear weapons we mean independent possession, having 'control' over them as just defined. 'Possession' would imply that the nation either had manufactured the weapons itself or had been given possession and control of them by some other nation. A non-dissemination agreement should provide against either of those things happening."
(ibid., pp. 28, 29)

It is quite obvious that in these definitions carefully formulated by Mr. Burns there is one very important flaw: they cover only national control and national possession of nuclear weapons, and do not at all affect that way of spreading these weapons which is opened up within the framework of the NATO multilateral nuclear force -- that is, through the multilateral control and multilateral possession of nuclear weapons. That is the whole point; and, no matter what you say, Mr. Burns, you cannot conceal the fact that the Western Powers are striving to limit the scope of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons by placing the NATO multilateral nuclear force outside the scope of its application.

It is impossible to agree with such an approach. An agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons must be comprehensive, without any exceptions. In the Tass statement dated 27 July we read that -

"The quarantine against the spread of nuclear weapons must be effective; it must be such that it would be impossible to circumvent it in any way."

(ENDC/138, p.3)

The NATO multilateral nuclear force is contrary to and incompatible with such an agreement.

There is another point which we deem it necessary to mention today in the Committee in connexion with the statements made by the representatives of the Western Powers last Thursday, 23 July, concerning the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.201). We wish to say that those representatives have not replied to a single one of the arguments which we put forward in confirmation of the fact that the multilateral nuclear force is a form of dissemination of nuclear weapons. They have not been able to refute a single one of the facts we have cited which show that

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within the framework of the multilateral nuclear force the West German revenge-seekers will be given access to weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Timberlake and his NATO colleagues have avoided commenting in any way on the generally-known facts concerning the way in which the members of that alliance have, over the past few years, abrogated one after the other the restrictions in the field of armaments which were laid down for the Federal Republic of Germany by the Paris agreements and which were boosted at the time as firm guarantees against a rebirth of aggressive German militarism, and concerning the way in which the States members of NATO have now gone as far as the last limit -- the abrogation of the prohibition to the Federal Republic of Germany to have access to nuclear weapons.

Nor have the representatives of the Western Powers uttered a word about the fact, as we have shown in detail, that the Federal Republic of Germany is the only West European State member of NATO that is actively striving to secure the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force, which is precisely intended to quench the nuclear thirst of the West German revenge-seekers.

The representatives of the States members of NATO have not said anything to the Committee about the fact that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to defray 40 per cent of the total expenditure involved in the creation of the multilateral nuclear force, obviously with a view to getting an equivalent compensation for these enormous sums -- that is to say, getting the right to put its finger not on the safety-catch, of course, but on the trigger of the multilateral nuclear force.

Nor have the representatives of the Western Powers in any way explained their attitude towards the statements made by representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany -- statements which we have cited -- about their expectation to obtain through participation in the multilateral nuclear force the power to manufacture their own nuclear weapons, which would be under their national control alone.

At the meeting on 23 July Mr. Timberlake tried -- for the n-th time -- to make out that within the framework of the multilateral nuclear force there would be no dissemination of nuclear weapons. What did he put forward in support of this assertion? Here is what he said:

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"No single participant [in the multilateral nuclear force] would be able to fire the missiles, since firing of missiles in war-time would be by decision of the United States and an agreed number of other participants. Furthermore, no nation participating in the multilateral force could withdraw any element of the force and place it under national control." (ibid., p.33)

But, Mr. Timberlake, in the first place, even if all you said were the case, it makes no difference, it would not alter the substance of the matter. The access of non-nuclear States members of NATO, and in the first place of Western Germany, to nuclear weapons would still be access; Mr. Timberlake has not even attempted to deny this. Enough has already been said here about the peace-endangering consequences of allowing the West German revenge-seekers to have access to nuclear weapons, and I do not think there is any need to dwell on that subject again at present.

Secondly, it is extremely difficult to believe that the United States will be able so firmly and reliably to control its NATO allies, particularly Western Germany, that, having given them access to nuclear weapons, it will be in a position to prevent the possibility of these weapons being used at the discretion of the allies themselves. Only a few days ago statements were made at the highest levels in Washington and Bonn to the effect that the United States in no way dominates its allies, especially Western Germany, and that these allies carry out their own policies without being subordinated to the United States.

You no doubt remember in what connexion these statements were made. They were a reply to a statement made by President de Gaulle at a Press conference on 23 July. The President of France said that Washington was still keeping Western Europe in subordination. The very next day the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hastened to deny in an official statement the French President's allegation and stressed that German policy did not depend either on the United States or on France. But if that is so, if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is really carrying out a policy independent of the United States, and if the United States is not striving to subordinate that policy to its own control, then how is it possible, Mr. Timberlake, to convince anyone that within the framework of the multilateral nuclear force the United States will control Western Germany?

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We do not know, of course, whether you yourself believe in the illusions which you are sowing here in the Committee; but I can tell you quite definitely that you will not get us to believe in them. I do not think anyone else will believe in those illusions except people who are completely unacquainted either with the historical experience of the past few decades or with the political realities of today. The plan to create a NATO multilateral nuclear force is a way of giving access to nuclear weapons to a number of non-nuclear Powers, and in the first place to Western Germany.

The unwillingness of the United States and its allies to abandon this plan raises a most serious obstacle in the way to the solution of the vitally important problem of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Greatly as it is to be regretted, the facts lead one more and more to the conclusion that the Western Powers are not at all interested in solving ~~this~~ problem, although their representatives within the Committee and outside it are quite willing to say the contrary.

Is this not shown by the agreement recently concluded between the United States and the NATO bloc providing for a widening of the types of nuclear information which the United States is to impart to its NATO allies? Judging from what has been published concerning this agreement, it is also a question of helping the non-nuclear States members of NATO, and among them, of course, Western Germany, to prepare for the possession of nuclear weapons by mastering the techniques for their use.

Thus this agreement concerns the transmission to the United States' allies in NATO of the information required for training the personnel of the armed forces of those countries in the use of nuclear weapons, and of the data required for preparing designs for nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, as well as of information -- obviously intelligence data -- on the nuclear potential of the other side. Moreover, this varied information will now be transmitted not only to the Joint Command staffs of NATO but also separately to each of the States members of NATO -- that is to say, for national use.

What else is this but the creation of the conditions for bringing nuclear weapons within the reach of the non-nuclear members of NATO? It is, as it were, a preparatory step towards the future multilateral nuclear force, which in its turn, according to the plans of Bonn, and probably not only of Bonn, is to become the starting-point for the creation and possession of one's own -- that is, national -- nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

It is impossible not to see all the danger of such steps taken by the United States Government.

The United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, has on several occasions stated here that the United States Government has the firm intention of adhering to the Irish resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1961, which -

"Calls upon all States, and in particular upon the States at present possessing nuclear weapons, to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons ..." (A/RES/1665 (XVI)).

But can anyone take seriously the interpretation according to which an agreement under which the United States will transmit to its NATO allies various secrets concerning the military use of nuclear energy is not contrary to the resolution solemnly adopted by the United Nations General Assembly? Such naïve people are not easy to find nowadays. The peoples have learnt a good deal; it is impossible to delude them.

In connexion with the conclusion of the new agreement between the United States and the NATO military bloc to make available to the countries members of NATO information concerning nuclear weapons, on 24 July the Tass agency published in Moscow a statement to which I have already referred and in which the dangerous consequences of this step are subjected to a serious analysis of principle. The statement by Tass says in particular:

"At the same time as the agreement to make information of nuclear weapons available is signed, at the same time as West German officers and ratings are already going on board the destroyer 'Biddle' -- the first ship which is the prototype of the multilateral nuclear force, the plan for the creation of which is being hatched within the recesses of NATO -- United States representatives at the disarmament negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee give assurances that the United States of America is against the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Of course, such a divergence between words and deeds does not testify to the sincerity of the United

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"States approach to the solution of so important a problem as the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. It turns out that while they say they are in favour of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the United States politicians are at the same time consolidating juridically, in treaty form, the possibilities for its dissemination." (ENDC/138, p.3)

These words need to be thought over -- and thought over very seriously -- by the participants in the disarmament negotiations.

The Soviet delegation has requested the Secretariat to circulate the statement by Tass as an official document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We should like to express the hope that all delegations will carefully study that statement by Tass, which has a direct bearing on the question that is the subject of our discussion -- the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The question naturally arises, what do the United States and the other Western Powers intend to do now: will they persist in their actions aimed at the dissemination of nuclear weapons, with all the dangerous consequences involved, or will they heed the warning voices of the peoples and governments and stop sliding down this slope of preparation for a nuclear war?

Time has not yet run out; it is still possible to stop the course of events in a dangerous direction; it is not yet too late to begin jointly the preparation of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons which would close all loop-holes to these weapons and prevent any access to them -- direct or indirect -- by the West German revenge-seekers, whether through the NATO multilateral nuclear force or in any other way.

We are prepared to begin preparing such an agreement tomorrow, even today. It depends on you, representatives of the Western Powers, on you alone. You have only to say that you are prepared to agree to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to national or multilateral control and possession, and our discussion here in the Committee will immediately move on to the practical stage of preparing a draft agreement. Thus the whole development of events on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons will move in another, positive direction -- a direction which corresponds to the interests of the peoples, the interests of all mankind.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Time has not yet run out, and we are waiting for your answer. But we cannot pass over in silence reports to the effect that the United States Government has decided to conclude the negotiations on the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force and to put it into operation by 1 January 1965. If that is so, the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee might well be the last at which it is still possible to stop the process of the dissemination of nuclear weapons. This places on us all an increased responsibility in the eyes of the peoples of the world.

The Soviet delegation believes that, in the conditions which have come about, the utmost efforts of all members of the Committee should be concentrated on the question of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Any failure to solve this question would be inadmissible, because the consequences would be too dangerous.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Permit me first of all to associate myself with our co-Chairmen and other colleagues who have spoken before me in expressing our profound gratitude to, and respect for, Sir Paul Mason, who has worked with us for so long a time in our Committee. We should like to wish our colleague good health, happiness and all success. Knowing his deep interest in disarmament matters, we are convinced that, even outside the walls of this building, Sir Paul will still consider himself to be a participant in our negotiations.

I should now like to offer my comments on two measures the urgency of which from the point of view of the further development of the process of easing international tension is a challenge to our Committee. I am referring to the question of reducing the military budgets of States, and the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

At our 193rd meeting, and again today, the delegations of the socialist countries have stated their views on the desirability and practical feasibility of a measure which would not only have the effect of partially relieving the nations of the burden of ever-increasing military expenditures but would also help towards improving the international atmosphere and restricting the arms race. This morning Mr. Tsarapkin has reminded us of the specific proposal of the Soviet Union to conclude an agreement on a reduction of the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent (ENDC/123), and five weeks ago the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted to the members of the

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Committee some additional considerations concerning the implementation of this measure, including the possibility of adopting at least an intermediate measure.

This morning Mr. Lobodycz referred to the statement made by Mr. Zorin at our meeting of 25 June in which he suggested -

"... that the Committee express, in one form or another, the intention of the participants in the Disarmament negotiations to take the path of reducing their military budgets, and that it appeal to other States to follow that example. This could be a declaration by the States members of the Committee, an appeal by them to the other States of the world, or even simply a statement of intention. The main thing is not the form of the appropriate document, but the contents; it should not be difficult to reach agreement on the form."

(ENDC/PV.193, p.34)

We have already expressed -- and we express once again -- our agreement with this measure, and we hold the opinion that it could break the vicious circle in which our negotiations on the reduction of military budgets have been up to now. Together with the other members of the Committee, we realize that its implementation would be only the beginning of the road which we have to go along in this field; but it would undoubtedly be a beginning, the importance of which would not be merely symbolical. The adoption of an appeal would be tantamount to a reciprocal assurance by the States participating in our negotiations that they are sincerely striving to bring about a relaxation of tension in international relations, even if by way of partial measures. As a result of this appeal the question of reducing military budgets would be brought up directly before the competent legislative and executive bodies of the various States.

In this connexion the economic aspect of the question is also of some importance. We have already drawn attention to this in the statement we made on 25 June (ibid., pp. 42, 43), and I do not intend to repeat what has been said. But I should like to stress that in this respect also the suggested measure would entail mutual advantages for both sides. After all, no State can be said to have surplus resources for which no use could be found in the economic, social and cultural spheres. We are decisively in favour of including within the scope of the suggested measure a provision to the effect that a portion of the budgetary resources thus saved could be devoted to

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rendering economic assistance to developing countries. The attention of the Social and Economic Council has been drawn to this aspect of the question at its present session.

I do not intend to add anything more to the list of advantages -- they are well known enough already -- which would accrue from the implementation of the proposal for the reduction of military budgets. No one who is interested in the events taking place in the world today can have any doubt about them.

Why, then, despite the obvious advantages to which many of the delegations here have drawn attention, are the negotiations on the reduction of military budgets still meeting with the reluctance of our Western colleagues to accept this proposal? The ice barrier which they are trying to erect round this question cannot, in our opinion, stand up for long against the force of common sense and cogent logic.

What, for instance, is the sense of the objections which have been put forward at our 193rd meeting and again today against the Soviet proposal? What bearing, for instance, has the objection about the incomparability of the military budgets of the socialist and the capitalist States on an appeal to States to carry out a reduction of their military budgets as they see fit -- I repeat, as they see fit -- and to an extent in keeping with the need to safeguard their security? What is the aim of the demand for the verification of data or for technical investigations regarding the structure of the military budgets of States in connexion with a measure which would be based on the policy of mutual example?

If our Western colleagues are again insisting in this connexion on preliminary agreement regarding control measures, we do not think that they are doing so because of any need of such measures for the actual reduction of military budgets. After all, it is well known that a unilateral, uncontrolled reduction of military budgets took place in the recent past and no fears or objections were expressed that such a measure might lead to unilateral advantages. The method of mutual example, although its results are the minimum which we can aim at, is obviously suited in many ways to present-day conditions.

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The first fruits have already appeared. It is well known that since the Soviet Union reduced its military budget for 1964-65 by 4.3 per cent in comparison with the previous year, the United States of America has announced that it is reducing its military expenditure for the same period by approximately 2 per cent. It has been shown in recent times that the method of mutual example could also be the basis for other very important measures which, despite their limited nature, would have a positive significance.

That position fully applies to the question under discussion today. Here, too, the socialist countries do not fail to respond to the slightest manifestation of good will. They are prepared to conclude an agreement for a 10 to 15 per cent reduction of military budgets or, as a preliminary minimum solution, to accept an appeal for the reduction of military budgets by way of mutual example.

I should like to express the hope that the delegations of the Western countries will reconsider their position and will help to ensure that all the existing possibilities in this direction are put to good use.

In the second part of my statement today I should like to revert once more to a problem the solution of which is becoming increasingly urgent every day, because the further development of events, unless decisive measures are taken, may very soon go beyond the critical borderline. At our 201st meeting the Western delegations made certain statements which compel us to state clearly again our position on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. We had expected that our Western colleagues, in view of the reality of the danger involved in the dissemination of nuclear weapons, a danger which they themselves recognize, would show a readiness to take effective measures to prevent such a development.

The socialist delegations have done everything to make easier the path towards the solution of this urgent question. In this connexion I should like to draw the attention of the Committee once again to the statement made by Mr. Zorin in which he appealed to the Western Powers immediately to begin negotiations the aim of which would be ---

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"... to conclude such an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as would preclude any possibility for their dissemination, and would close every loop-hole of access to these weapons to those who do not now possess them but are striving at all costs to gain direct or at least indirect access to them, either by establishing their own national control over nuclear weapons or by participating within the framework of military alliances in the possession, disposal and control of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.195, p.15)

That formulation is sufficiently detailed, perfectly clear and unambiguous. It leaves no doubt that measures against the further spread of nuclear weapons must effectively bar all direct and indirect ways of access to nuclear weapons to countries which do not now possess them. For this reason we were somewhat surprised at the remark made on 23 July by the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, that --

"... the statements of certain representatives in this Committee have left the impression that they are concerned only with the danger of dissemination through transfer." (ENDC/PV.201, p.32)

We consider that not one of the statements of the delegations of the socialist countries, and particularly the formulation which I have just quoted and on the basis of which the Soviet Union proposes that we begin negotiations, leaves any room for such an impression.

It is evident that there are basically two ways which could lead to the further spread of nuclear weapons. The first is national manufacture or any other way by which individual States would acquire these weapons and establish direct national control over them. But this way is beset with certain difficulties. There are not only technical and economic obstacles. In some States this way would also run into serious political obstacles, including, above all, the decisive opposition of world public opinion to nuclear armament, particularly in regard to those States which bear the responsibility for unleashing the Second World War.

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It is precisely to those States that the second way appears tempting: that is, the way of acquiring access to nuclear weapons indirectly, through military groupings. This second possibility is assuming a completely concrete form in the shape of the NATO multilateral nuclear force which has been repeatedly referred to here.

The Soviet Union's proposal to begin negotiations on measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons rightly insists on barring to States not only the first, that is the direct way, but also the second, the indirect way to nuclear weapons. The fact that in the statements of the socialist delegations considerable attention is devoted to the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force is quite understandable and natural. Today it is perfectly clear that the plan to create this force is the main obstacle to the reaching of agreement on the adoption of appropriate measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The difficulty is not that the socialist countries would restrict their proposals merely to indirect dissemination but, on the contrary, that the Western Powers are trying to restrict the whole problem merely to so-called direct dissemination through national manufacture or the transfer of nuclear weapons to the national control of individual States. This is not just an impression, but an indisputable fact. On 23 July Mr. Timberlake again quoted (ENDC/PV.201, p.35) a recent statement to the effect that the United States was seeking --

"... an international agreement under which the nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into national control of States not now possessing them, as well as not to assist such States in manufacturing nuclear weapons."

(ENDC/PV.195, pp. 34, 35)

Similar statements restricting the problem of the dissemination of nuclear weapons merely to their transfer to the "national" or "independent" control of individual States appear also in the statements of other Western delegations. Mr. Tsarapkin has also pointed out that fact this morning. It is evident that their aim is to

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conceal the danger inherent in the possibility of the indirect dissemination of nuclear weapons and that they are trying even to legalize such dissemination, which it is intended to carry out within the framework of NATO through the creation of the so-called multilateral nuclear force.

Our position in regard to that plan and our serious and well-founded objections to it have already been explained in detail here many times. We are compelled to state that the attempts of the Western delegations to refute our objections, to justify the plan to create the multilateral nuclear force, and to prove its harmlessness from the point of view of the further spread of nuclear weapons, are utterly unconvincing. Today I should like to dwell briefly on just a few of those arguments, particularly those which were put forward by our Western colleagues at the 201st meeting a week ago.

The first thing that strikes one in their statements is their anxiousness, not to close all ways to the further spread of nuclear weapons, but rather to resist the justified demand to put an end to the dangerous policy of arming the West German militarists with nuclear weapons. It should be emphasized that therein lies the gist of their arguments.

They assure us, for example, that, in the event of the creation of the multilateral nuclear force, there would be no dissemination of nuclear weapons. Mr. Tsarapkin pointed out today that there had even been attempts to represent this step as a measure which would prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Significant in this respect is, for example, the aforementioned statement of Mr. Timberlake, who on 23 July went so far as to allege that --

"... by offering an alternative to national nuclear weapon programmes, the multilateral force should increase incentives and improve the prospect for halting the growth in national weapon-producing centres."

(ENDC/PV.201, p.33)

Is it not clear that such a position is tantamount to an attempt to open one channel for the dissemination of nuclear weapons for the sake of an alleged closing of another?

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

I repeat, "for the sake of an alleged closing", because in fact the multilateral force is not, and is not intended to be, a barrier against the direct access of Western Germany to nuclear weapons. In the course of our discussions many very cogent proofs have been adduced that the creation of the multilateral force is regarded by the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany as an initial step conducing to the achievement of the final aim, which is the complete possession of nuclear weapons.

The concept on which the Western Powers base their justification of the plan to create the NATO multilateral nuclear force is, to say the least, self-delusion. In any case, it seems that the delegations of the United States and other Western countries realize what Mr. Tsarapkin has already stressed today: namely, that the NATO multilateral nuclear force is to quench the nuclear thirst of the West German Bundeswehr. That in itself is a fact that tells a lot.

Some of our Western colleagues try to convince us that, as a result of the creation of the multilateral nuclear force, there would not really be any difference, that the situation in regard to the possession and control of nuclear weapons would not be changed in the least. One has only to put the question: why, then, create a multilateral nuclear force? Why is the plan for its creation causing such serious differences of opinion even among the States members of NATO?

The irrefutable facts show the following. At the present time four States possess nuclear weapons. It cannot be doubted that after the creation of the multilateral nuclear force the situation would be quite different. Although the plan for its creation has apparently not yet taken final shape, there is information to the effect that the fleet, equipped with nuclear weapons, would be in the joint possession and under the joint control of the States participating in the multilateral nuclear force. Can such a development be regarded in any other way than as the further spread of nuclear weapons? In this respect what is decisive is not the form but the content --- that is, the fact that more States members of NATO will in one way or another obtain access to the possession of nuclear weapons and to control over them.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

It is obvious that the whole concept of the multilateral nuclear force has been created in order to satisfy the demands of certain circles in the Federal Republic of Germany in the matter of arming the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. This is fully confirmed by a number of facts. It is well known that the expenditure involved in creating and maintaining the nuclear force is to be apportioned in a very peculiar manner. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany are each to defray 40 per cent of this expenditure, while all the remaining Western European countries together are to defray only 20 per cent. This arrangement in itself shows who is in fact interested in this plan.

The facts of which I have spoken show once again that the fate of further negotiations on measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons depends entirely on whether the Governments of all the nuclear Powers are prepared to accept an agreement which would establish really effective barriers against the further spread of nuclear weapons and which would cut off all ways -- direct or indirect -- through which States not now possessing nuclear weapons could obtain access to them. The possibility of concluding such an agreement undoubtedly exists. This has again been confirmed by the Soviet Government's proposal that we begin the appropriate negotiations. This proposal creates a suitable basis for negotiations and, in our opinion, there is nothing to prevent its being carried out immediately.

The replies which the Western delegations gave to this proposal at the 201st meeting show, however, that the Western Powers are still not prepared to engage in negotiations on this basis. On the contrary, it seems that they wish to continue going along the path of concessions to the pressure of one of the States members of NATO, the Federal Republic of Germany, which is striving to obtain nuclear weapons at all costs. They wish to go along that path although they must realize quite clearly that such a path is bound to lead to a worsening of the international situation and to a general intensification of the arms race.

The Tass statement of 24 July, which has been mentioned here, warns of this danger in connexion with the announcement of an agreement between the United States Government and the NATO military bloc on "widening the types of atomic information" (ENDC/138). It should be emphasized that in that event the United States and the

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

other Western Powers which support it would bear all the responsibility for the serious consequences of such a development. It is obvious that the socialist countries cannot watch with folded arms the creation of a multilateral nuclear force. This has been stressed most convincingly in the Notes addressed by the Soviet Government to the Governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (ENDC/137).

No one can doubt that the creation of a multilateral nuclear force would lead to a serious complication of the general situation, would shake the basis on which it is now possible to achieve agreement on measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, and would also undoubtedly have unfavourable effects on the possibility of solving other problems which are ripe for solution. It must be obvious to every sober-minded person that such a step would be in blatant contradiction to the general desire for a further relaxation of international tension and for the strengthening of mutual confidence among States. Such a step would deal a heavy blow to efforts the first results of which have been noted with satisfaction in this Committee.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): First, I should like on behalf of the Canadian delegation to join very sincerely in the expressions of regret at the departure of Sir Paul Mason, as well as in the good wishes for his future which have been addressed to him by the co-Chairmen and other representatives here.

Before beginning my prepared statement, which relates to the question of the reduction of military expenditure, I should like to say a few words on the comments made by the Soviet representative this morning on the position of the Canadian delegation on negotiations to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet representative quoted at length what I had said, and I think that he quoted me quite correctly. He found that the definitions which I had given referred to the prevention of dissemination in the sense of preventing wider national control and national possession of weapons. In that he was correct. He found that my definitions did not rule out the possibility of the creation of the contemplated multilateral force. That is also true.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Now, the question is why this idea of a multilateral force should have developed in the NATO alliance. The answer is that it is felt that there is need for participation of the European members of NATO in a deterrent to the possible use of nuclear weapons against their countries. It is well known and has been stressed here many times that there are no less than 800 to 1,000 intermediate and medium-range missiles deployed in Russia and directed towards Western Europe. That is a fact. The other reasons for which it is considered that it is desirable for the nations of Europe other than those which at present possess nuclear weapons to have some share in and more responsibility for providing a deterrent against those threats can well be ascertained from many publications and many speeches in many places.

The Canadian Delegation does not maintain that this is necessarily a desirable development; but it is designed as an alternative to the possible proliferation of national possession, which I think all those concerned would admit to be worse. It is therefore a measure which has been proposed in order to prevent something happening which I think all concerned would admit to be regrettable. I think this proposal should be judged in that light.

I should like to say something that I have said before here, and it is that, while certain great nations maintain the nuclear power to destroy others, they cannot expect that others will not think of means to protect themselves. We cannot freeze the present state of affairs, in which certain Powers possess this nuclear weapon which could destroy others, and keep all other nations in a state of nuclear powerlessness. In other words, we cannot have the nuclear sheep -- the present nuclear Powers, and the nuclear goats -- those which do not have the nuclear weapon and are never going to get it.

I think these things ought to be given some consideration in looking at this whole problem. It is not a problem that can be solved in any absolute way by freezing the present state of affairs. It can only be solved if there is a real move on the part of the nuclear Powers to begin to divest themselves of some of the power they now have. Then they will be in a better position to insist that any nation which might possibly think of acquiring nuclear power for itself must be inspired by a spirit of revenge and a determination to destroy others, in contrast with the virtuous views and intentions of the present possessors of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Having said that, I should like to pass now to my statement on the proposal for the reduction of military budgets. The basic attitude of my delegation towards this proposal is clear and was expressed by Mr. Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in his intervention at the Conference on 26 March, when he said:

"... all countries represented here would certainly be anxious, given the proper conditions, to see a reduction everywhere of military expenditure." (ENDC/PV.178, p.18)

What are the proper conditions, as the Canadian delegation sees them? They are conditions which will ensure that whatever reductions are agreed upon are in fact carried out. An acceptable agreement in this area would be one under which all parties could be confident that an agreed reduction in military spending meant in fact a proportionate decrease in the military activities of the States parties to that agreement.

At our 172nd and 184th meetings the Canadian delegation outlined in considerable detail our position with respect to the suggestion of the Soviet Union that a formal international agreement be concluded for a reduction of from 10 to 15 per cent in the military budgets of States (ENDC/123). I do not intend today to repeat all the points I made at those two meetings. In my two statements I outlined a number of major obscurities which needed to be removed before States could have such confidence. Other delegations have also pointed to the problems of verification and assurance which must be solved before this Committee can be certain that an agreement to reduce military budgets is a practicable measure which would achieve the purpose of checking the arms race, as the sponsors of this proposal claim.

Unfortunately, to date the Soviet representative and his colleagues from other Eastern European countries do not appear inclined to undertake the serious study of these problems, including the problem of verification, which we believe must precede a decision regarding the feasibility of this measure. At our meeting of 25 June Mr. Zorin asked whether we in the West were prepared to chart the course,^{1/} as he put it, towards the reduction of military budgets (ENDC/PV.193, provisional, p.71). He asked for a clear answer to that question. As far as the Canadian delegation is

^{1/} These words do not appear in the final record (p.48).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

concerned, our answer is in the affirmative. But the essence of a chart is that it gives clear and detailed information. For example, a sea chart does not simply state or show in a diagram that Copenhagen is approximately at 56° bearing from Leningrad, or vice versa, and that the distance is 1200 kilometres. To say merely "We will reduce our military budget by 10 to 15 per cent" would be equivalent to that kind of chart. If we are to reduce military budgets as an effective pre-disarmament measure, this Committee must be prepared to do a great deal of intensive and detailed work so that all the information necessary to get from A to B, from present levels of military expenditure to levels 10 to 15 per cent lower, will be available.

The only indication we in the West have received of what the Soviet Union considers appropriate verification procedures for budgetary reductions is contained in the language of chapter II, article 13, paragraph 2, of the Soviet Union's draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. That article says:

"The International Disarmament Organization shall verify the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article through its financial inspectors, to whom the States parties to the Treaty undertake to grant unimpeded access to the records of central financial institutions concerning the reduction in their budgetary appropriations resulting from the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and to the relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies." (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.12)

We should be interested to learn whether the Soviet Union considers the provisions for verification of an agreed reduction in military budgets carried out in advance of general and complete disarmament would be similar to those which are sketched out in that article of their draft treaty. Of course the provisions of that article would require considerable clarification, since such terms as "central financial institutions" and "relevant decisions of their legislative and executive bodies" are very general expressions indeed. Precisely what verification arrangements the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept in connexion with the reduction of military expenditure as a collateral measure is a vital matter which would need to be explored by the group of experts which we and other delegations have suggested should be set up to deal with this and other aspects of this subject.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

But there would be other "proper conditions" for reducing military budgets --- for example, if States put into effect concrete measures of disarmament which would result, of necessity, in stopping spending on the armaments or forces affected by the measures concerned. As our colleague from Italy said this morning, good examples of measures which have been proposed to this Committee and which would involve substantial reductions in military expenditure are the proposals for a freeze of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles, the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, and the destruction of certain categories of armaments on a reciprocal basis --- that is, the destruction of certain types of bombers by the United States and the Soviet Union (ENDC/120; PV.176, pp. 5 et seq.). The freeze would involve substantial savings, since it would halt the costly competitive spiral in the race for more and newer types of weapons of mass destruction. The cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes would mean shutting down plants which now absorb annually very considerable financial resources. Finally, destruction of agreed types of armaments would release the sums which are now spent on the operation and maintenance of those armaments.

However, we are prepared to consider the more indirect course represented by the proposal for budgetary limitation and reduction suggested by the Soviet Union. This course, as I have just indicated, and as has been pointed out many times in this Committee, requires careful plotting and study before we can know whether it is feasible. If the Soviet Union is convinced that the difficulties we have mentioned can be overcome, it should indicate its willingness to participate in a serious, objective study by experts of the various problems which we in the West have explained. If the Soviet Union is so prepared, I believe that progress towards agreement on this measure may prove possible.

This brings me to the second proposal which the Soviet Union has advanced as a possible preliminary step, or alternative, at this stage to the conclusion of a formal agreement on the reduction of military budgets. I refer to the suggestion that this Committee issue a declaratory appeal welcoming the budgetary cuts which certain States have already made and calling on all other States to follow their example.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

At our meeting of 25 June, as the representative of Czechoslovakia has reminded us, Mr. Zorin outlined what he considered might be the suitable contents of such a document (ENDC/PV.193, p.34). The Canadian authorities have considered seriously the implications of such a step by this Committee. Their conclusion is that a declaration at this moment on the lines suggested by the Soviet Union would have little value. By it we should be asking States to undertake a course of action which we know could not be carried very far in the absence of an effective agreement which would give assurance that all major military Powers were taking positive steps to reduce their military establishments.

The Canadian delegation believes that it is the legitimate and constructive task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to undertake to work out practical measures which would permit the reduction of military expenditures and ensure adequate verification of the obligations entered into; and we have asked the Soviet Union to co-operate in this task. However, to issue an appeal before any serious attempt had been made to come to grips with this task would in our view, mean that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was avoiding its real function as a negotiating body which has the responsibility of facing up to the real problems involved in disarmament measures and working out solutions to them.

That is one reason why a declaration of the kind the Soviet Union delegation has suggested would be of little value. What other reasons are there? For one thing, we have heard that some of the nations represented in this Committee feel that, in view of certain threats that armed force may be used against them and their vital interests, they are unable at this time to reduce their defensive preparations and hence their military expenditure.

We recognize that to a certain degree the two greatest Powers realize that their security would not be enhanced at the present by increased spending; in fact they have been able to reduce the level of their spending, and we have all been encouraged by that. But if there has been a relaxation of tension so far as these great Powers are concerned -- and we all welcome that heartily -- in other parts of the world there are conflicts which either have involved or may develop into actual military operations. Hence, not all of the members of this Committee

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

could join in an appeal stating that they were reducing their military expenditure. The other nations of the world, to whom the appeal would be addressed, might then well say, "If you are not reducing your military expenditures, what right have you to exhort us to reduce ours?" This Committee might be made to look a little foolish if we made such an appeal.

Even if the other nations were sufficiently polite not to point out the difference between our exhortations and our practice, which I have just mentioned, they would surely feel that such an appeal was a very small result from the months of debate the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has gone through since the last encouraging move to limit the arms race. The point is that we should devote our time and effort here to proposals which could bring about more important results.

Canada -- and I am sure all other nations represented here -- would like to see military expenditures reduced everywhere. I am echoing the statement of the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs which I quoted at the beginning. Canada would like to see the unproductive use of taxation moneys stopped, and the released amount put to use improving economic and social conditions everywhere, particularly in the less-developed countries. However, this stopping of military expenditure and diversion to other more valuable purposes has to be done in a real, practical way, corresponding to the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5); and I have indicated how, in the view of the Canadian delegation, this problem should be approached.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): Before I call on the next speaker, who is the representative of Romania, allow me to say this. I regret that I have to leave on an aeroplane which will be going in half an hour's time, because I have to be back in London tonight. I hope that the representative of Romania and the Committee will acquit me of any apparent discourtesy if I leave the meeting at this time, and I should be grateful if the Committee would permit me to hand over the Chair to Sir Paul Mason.

Sir Paul Mason took the Chair.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should first of all like to associate myself with the other delegations in expressing my appreciation of the high personal qualities of Sir Paul Mason, who to our great regret will be leaving us. In addition I should like, on behalf both of myself and of the Romanian delegation, to tender to Sir Paul and Lady Mason our best wishes for long life, happiness and success.

We listened with keen interest to today's speeches by the representatives of Poland, Italy, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Canada. We intend to study them thoroughly. The fact that we are still negotiating on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons proves -- if proof were needed -- the especial importance and topicality of this problem. For ourselves we have already set forth our position on numerous occasions. The Romanian delegation is opposed to all forms of dissemination of nuclear weapons.

It is generally recognized that, if the spread of nuclear weapons to an ever-increasing number of countries were prevented, the cause of peace would gain. Conversely, a rise in the number of countries possessing those weapons would considerably increase the danger to mankind of those terrible instruments of mass destruction and consequently the risk of a thermo-nuclear war. As we see it, if we are to have peace and general security, we must logically avoid any step of a nature to hamper or compromise the efforts which we must all make to achieve general and complete disarmament and, first and foremost, the elimination of the nuclear threat.

Clearly, a non-dissemination agreement in itself would in no way mean that the problem had been solved. It goes without saying that we must, after concluding such an agreement, consistently work up to the very end for the liquidation of all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles -- that is to say, the elimination of the very possibility of unleashing and waging a nuclear war. That idea is embodied in the Preamble to the Moscow Treaty, which we all signed a year ago and which states that the principal aim is --

"... the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons" (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

Non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself; it is part and parcel of the campaign to eliminate forever all weapons, and above all nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it would seem, despite our recognition of the need to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons, that we still face difficulties which, if not removed, can hardly fail to prevent the conclusion of an agreement.

The main obstacle is of course the plan of certain NATO Powers to create a multilateral nuclear force. I need not repeat the arguments developed at such length at our previous discussions by the representatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries nor analyse the convincing arguments advanced by the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Nigeria, Burma, India and Ethiopia. One conclusion that is inescapable, however is that all the delegations except those of the NATO members believe that the creation of a multilateral force would lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, with all the harmful consequences which that would entail for the international situation as a whole.

It is precisely in order to promote international security that an agreement must be reached on the meaning of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The same idea is brought out in the Notes addressed by the Soviet Government on 11 July to the Governments of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany (ENDC/137).

Although it is obvious that the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons postulates a limitation, not an increase in the number of nuclear Powers, it has been argued in this Committee that the multilateral force would be compatible with the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. In the same vein the Canadian representative Mr. Burns, sought on 23 July to interpret the terms "possession" and "control", as used in the Irish resolution 1665 (XVI) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 December 1961, in such a way as to render meaningless the proposal for the conclusion of an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.201, pp.28,29).

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

The Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, has already spoken about this question today. I, too, should like to stress that the meaning ascribed by Mr. Burns to "possession" and "control" is far removed from the real sense of those words, in the context both of our negotiations and of the Irish resolution, which we all agree to take as a starting-point and which, moreover, was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. The resolution calls for the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions --

"... under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons". (A/RES/1665(XVI))

As has already been recalled here, Mr. Aiken, leader of the Irish delegation, when defending that paragraph against criticisms to the effect that the concept of "possession" was too narrow to cover all possible cases, showed that, on the contrary, the word used -- "control" -- was very much wider than "ownership", for non-nuclear States would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons by ownership or by any other means (A/C.1/SR.1209, para. 12).

A universally-recognized principle of interpretation of texts is that, where the text does not make a distinction, we should not make one either: "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus". The text is perfectly clear: no type of possession or control is allowed, however acquired.

The Canadian representative gives a different interpretation of this clear text, by introducing extraneous concepts: independent possession, independent control. He thus modifies the precise and complete concept which alone can satisfy those who do not desire the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the notion used in the Irish resolution, in such a way as to allow of the transmission of information on nuclear weapons, and of control and possession of these weapons, through the creation of a multilateral nuclear force and the participation in that force of States not yet possessing nuclear weapons. That hardly corresponds to the General Assembly's intentions in adopting resolution 1665 (XVI), for the unanimous vote in its favour was specifically due to its interpretation in the sense of universally-recognized general rules and the common interest in preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

I now come to another aspect of the problem. On 23 July the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, said:

"The multilateral force is being devised to provide a responsibly-controlled deterrent ..." (ENDC/PV.201, p.33) --

in the face of an alleged Soviet nuclear threat aimed at the densely-populated cities and industrial areas of Western Europe. Thus Mr. Timberlake maintains that a multilateral nuclear force would strengthen the security of certain States. As I have already said, this approach to the problem of national security is foreign to the very idea of security.

I need not cite again the well-known declarations of certain public figures in the United States and other Western countries --- so often mentioned in this Committee --- which show that the more the nuclear arms race is intensified, the more the security of all States is reduced, including that of States participating in the race. Hence the creation of the NATO multilateral nuclear force would not strengthen the international security of any State; indeed it would weaken the security of all States. It would lead, not to increased trust among States, but to the opposite.

A good deal has been said about the danger of giving access to nuclear weapons -- sooner or later -- to the non-nuclear NATO Powers, and particularly to the Federal Republic of Germany, through the multilateral nuclear force. I merely wish to point out that the country which is showing the keenest interest in the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force -- the Federal Republic of Germany -- has never during the last century been a victim of aggression.

The allegations regarding that country's lack of security which are adduced to justify the creation of a multilateral nuclear force seem to us particularly misplaced at the present time, when the improvement in the international political atmosphere makes it possible to consider maintaining and extending the agreements already reached. In what way is the security of the Federal Republic of Germany more threatened now than it was before? If we are going to talk about danger, there are other European States -- and first and foremost peoples which, like the Romanians, have suffered more than once from the aggression of German militarists -- who would have genuine cause to be anxious about their security.

If we really want to strengthen general security, we have at our disposal a number of effective instruments able to strengthen both European and world security. To mention only one, there is the well-known proposal of the socialist countries for

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77). Such an agreement would in our opinion be a stepping-stone towards liquidation of all existing military groupings. Other measures are equally capable of creating a climate more propitious to the strengthening of security in Europe by preventing the increase in the nuclear threat which would result from the access of non-nuclear countries -- including the Federal Republic of Germany -- to nuclear weapons. I refer to the well-known proposals concerning the creation of denuclearized zones in Europe and other regions, a problem which is also among those submitted to our Committee for examination.

Why do we not conclude such a pact? Would it not offer, besides genuine security, the necessary pre-conditions for the solution, through negotiations, of all as yet unresolved problems, first and foremost those raised by the liquidation of the vestiges of the Second World War? Why, then, persist with ideas implying military solutions, instead of entering on the only reasonable path, namely that of disarmament, which in any case is the raison d'être of our Committee?

Our Conference's agenda also includes, among other proposals, the United States proposal for a "freeze" of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles (ENDC/120). On 23 July the United States representative, Mr. Timberlake, said that such a measure would also tend to restrain proliferation of nuclear delivery vehicles and systems by limiting potential stocks, which, in his view, "would help in some way to contain the nuclear danger" (ENDC/PV.201, p.30).

In that connexion I should like to ask the following question: how does the "freeze" proposed by the United States fit in with the plan for creating a NATO multilateral nuclear force? As we know, this force is to comprise 25 surface vessels each equipped with eight Polaris missiles. Is that in harmony with the United States assertion that a "freeze" --

"... would halt the race for more and better strategic nuclear vehicles and open the path for reductions from present levels in all types of forces" (ENDC/PV.162, pp.16,17) --

as Mr. Foster said on 31 January?

Those are merely some of the aspects on which my delegation deemed it necessary to dwell at this stage of our discussions on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

The agenda for today's meeting also includes the problem of reducing military budgets. I do not intend to revert to all the aspects of that question, on which the Romanian delegation has already set forth its views (ENDC/PV.174, pp. 33 et seq.; Pv.193, pp.17-19). Today, while we are discussing both non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and reductions in military budgets, I should like to stress that the conclusion of an agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons would inevitably be conducive to a reduction in military budgets; conversely, the creation of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would stimulate a fresh increase in military expenditure.

As I have already had occasion to point out, the Romanian delegation considers that it is high time that all parties devoted due attention to this problem and took an appropriate decision. We see no objective obstacles here and, as has been proposed, we consider that we can pass without delay to the drafting of an appeal, addressed primarily to the Governments of the Great Powers, to reduce military expenditure. That would be one achievement -- albeit a modest one -- that we could report to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): If no other representative wishes to speak, I shall now call on the representative of the United States, who has asked to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): I apologize for prolonging this meeting, which has already been a long one. However, some of the statements made this morning have forced me to exercise the right of reply.

As I suggested last Thursday, previous Soviet statements on the multilateral nuclear force -- and this applies also to statements that have been made this morning -- should be viewed in the perspective of past Soviet attacks on other steps to improve NATO's co-operative defence and to promote European unity and Atlantic partnership (ENDC/PV.201. p.33). From those statements a clear Soviet preference emerges. It is that Western Europe should be debilitated, divided and defenceless. Indeed, the Soviet view that appears to be reflected in these attacks is of a world dominated by two great Powers, themselves engaged in a peaceful but Darwinian struggle for the survival of the fittest, with all others being more or less helpless bystanders. That seemed to be implied in today's statement by the Soviet representative.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

That is not the view held by my Government, nor, as the representative of Canada said this morning, is it the view of the Canadian Government. Fortunately, to judge from other recent Soviet statements, it may not be the only authoritative Soviet view either. Ours has never been a policy of attempting to freeze the situation existing at the end of the Second World War, when in fact we ourselves had a dominant position. We began very early to help in restoring Europe to its rightful place. I may recall that our initial offer of aid was not limited to Western Europe. At his press conference on 24 July President Johnson restated the policy of the United States in the following words:

"Most Europeans know that the United States has never had any interest whatsoever in trying to dominate Europe or any other area of the world.

On the contrary, the United States has constantly supported the strengthening of the free nations of Europe. We believe that Europe and the United States have great common interests, common purposes and common obligations".

We have therefore welcomed the fact that, as a result of our early assistance and Europe's major efforts of its own, Europe is no longer weak. We fully sympathize with its desire not to remain divided. Western Europe has now emerged as a major factor on the world scene. We welcome its new strength and hope to continue to work with it in close partnership, since we believe that this is in the best interests of Europe as a whole and of world peace.

We share the Soviet desire that history should not repeat itself. But, more than that, we are engaged in a co-operative effort with our allies to see to it that this does not happen. Our partnership with Europe involves more than co-operation in mutual defence, vital as that is. It is also, and perhaps more important, a creative effort looking towards the consolidation of European unity, world peace and better conditions of life for all peoples. It is based on a policy of reconciliation and hope for the future, not on outmoded punitive concepts which history has shown to be counterproductive. It recognizes the need for new forms of co-operation adjusted to present realities in Europe.

One of these realities is that the Federal Republic of Germany is a member in good standing of the community of nations. It has worked in close and loyal partnership with its allies in Europe and also in the Atlantic community, and it

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

continues to do so. It has merged its defence with theirs and has made clear in both word and deed its dedication to the cause of peace and human justice. This major accomplishment of the post-war era has created a basis for a new Europe -- a stable, prosperous and peaceful Europe.

It is unfortunate that Soviet statements often seem so intent on reviving bitter memories for Soviet political purposes. Such statements obscure the gains already achieved through a policy of reconciliation and co-operation. They only make it more difficult to realize the promise these gains hold for the future of Europe.

In taking realistically into account the changes which have occurred in Europe, the United States has never forgotten the special responsibilities which it shares with the Soviet Union because of our respective positions in the world power balance. This is particularly true as regards our firm policy against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our consistent application of this policy is a matter of record, a record which can well stand comparison with that of any other government.

The proposed multilateral force is no departure from that policy. As was the case with other steps to improve NATO's defences, the multilateral force is designed as a prudent and fully-controlled response to existing Soviet armaments. It fits the situation which now exists in Europe.

We have never believed in burying our heads in the sand. As Secretary of State Rusk put it, the multilateral force "would enable our allies to play a self-respecting role in nuclear deterrence, without proliferating national nuclear forces". With its principle of mixed manning and integrated control, such a force would fill the presently-felt political and military requirements for nuclear weapons to help defend the NATO area. It would do so in a way which provides the highest possible degree of assurance that the arrangements would be stable and would not involve dissemination. The concurrence of the United States would be required in any decision to use the force.

All this has been made clear to the Soviet Union; and, in addition, we have offered to enter into a formal agreement against dissemination, an agreement which would also make possible important undertakings by non-nuclear Powers against acquiring control of or manufacturing nuclear weapons. The Soviet response seems

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

to be either that we do not mean what we say or that such a commitment would not be trustworthy. I may say that the Soviet Union is hardly in a position to imply that such would be the case. Our record is too clear for any doubts on this matter.

It is no answer for the Soviet representative to cite changes made in the course of the years in the Paris agreements. In no case have the agreements been violated. All changes have been made with the full consent of the signatories, and all have remained within the framework of the original. None in any way alters the Federal Republic's obligation not to manufacture nuclear weapons.

As regards the Tass article which was cited this morning by Mr. Tsarapkin (ENDC/138), he and the representative of Czechoslovakia have sought to portray the new agreement on the exchange of atomic information with NATO which President Johnson has submitted to our Congress as if it constituted a departure from our firm policy against the dissemination of nuclear weapons or information. I can say categorically that that is not so. Apart from the formal statements against dissemination which the United States has made in various international forums, and our readiness to enter into a non-dissemination agreement with other nuclear Powers, the United States has imposed on itself strict legal restrictions as regards the dissemination of nuclear weapons, materials or information. I may add that we should welcome a move by the Soviet Union to subject itself to comparable restrictions.

The new agreement with NATO is based on the existing United States Atomic Energy Act as amended in 1958. There has been no change in our legislation. Within the limitations imposed by that legislation the United States has entered previously into bilateral agreements with most of its NATO allies for the exchange of atomic information for mutual defence purposes. Although we had a similar arrangement with NATO since 1955, it was more restrictive than any of the bilateral agreements. The new agreement merely puts them in phase. It is no broader than the most restrictive of the existing bilateral arrangements. Under both sets of agreements we can transmit only such information as is necessary for stated mutual defence purposes. Moreover, the United States retains the right to impose such further restrictions as it deems necessary on the transmission of information covered by the agreement. The agreement itself makes it clear that all information transmitted is to be used exclusively for the preparation or implementation of NATO defence plans and activities.

(Mr. Timberlake, United States)

As President Johnson made clear in his message transmitting the agreement to Congress, this information is needed to enable our allies to make effective use of nuclear delivery systems being provided by the United States under bilateral procedures and agreements. Its purpose is not to assist them to develop their own weapons or delivery systems. Moreover, the agreement itself states:

"There will be no transfer by the Government of the United States of America of atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapon systems involving restricted data."

In short, the agreement permits more effective allied participation in NATO's nuclear defence; it does not in any way depart from our policy of non-dissemination.

The real answer to any Soviet concern regarding the future of Europe is to be found in a just solution of the German problem on a basis responsive to the wishes of the German people, and one that would ensure the security of all concerned. Until that becomes possible, I hope that the Soviet Union will at least join us in a positive move towards peace and stability rather than reject such a move in fruitless recriminations over the past. Let us not go on for ever fighting the wars of the past; let us rather work with co-operation and understanding to make future wars impossible.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

To the panegyric which we have just heard from the United States representative regarding the war preparations of Western Germany and its access to nuclear weapons we shall, of course, reply in the most detailed manner after studying the verbatim record.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): If no other representative wishes to speak, I should like first, speaking in my personal capacity, to say to my colleagues and friends from Poland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Canada and Romania how much I value the words of, I repeat, quite undeserved kindness which they have addressed to me on the occasion of my impending departure.

Now, speaking as your Chairman pro tempore, I have to inform the Conference that I have received a communication from the United States co-Chairman relating to the programme of work to be taken up at our meeting next Thursday. This communication is as follows:

(The Chairman, United Kingdom)

"The United States delegation, in accordance with the procedure of work adopted at our 199th meeting, wishes to suggest to the Committee that the topic for conversation at the plenary meeting on Thursday, 6 August, be the verified freeze of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapons, as proposed in document ENDC/120".

If there are no comments on that communication, I shall take it that the Conference agrees to that proposal.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 203rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Peter Thomas, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Italy, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Romania and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 4 August 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

